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STAYING WITHIN THE LINES: THE QUESTION OF
POST-STABILIZATION TREATMENT FOR
ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS UNDER EMERGENCY
MEDICAID
Sean Elliott

INTRODUCTION

In June 2007, amid a torrent of controversy and criticism from across the
political spectrum, the United States Senate soundly rejected a bill that
would have brought significant reform to America's immigration system.1
The bill would have granted a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants and
established a new guest worker program, 2 and it would also have
strengthened the border by adding thousands of border patrol personnel and
constructing new barriers.3 Although the issue of illegal immigration has
long been a mainstay of U.S. politics, the bill awakened unusually striking
national divisions and caused many to question to what extent the United
States should accommodate not immigrants in general, but rather those who
have entered the United States unlawfully.4
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1. Jonathan Weisman, Immigration Bill Dies in Senate; Bipartisan Compromise
Fails to Satisfy the Right or the Left, WASH. POST, June 29, 2007, at A01; see
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong. (2007).
2.

Weisman, supra note 1.

3. Nicole Gaouette, The Immigration Debate: Bill Fails in Senate; Senate Buries
Immigration Bill, L.A. TiMES, June 29, 2007, at Al.
4. See Janet Hook, Immigration Proved Too Hot for Bush, Congress to Handle,
L.A. TIMES, July 1, 2007, at A20 (describing the heated political atmosphere surrounding
the 2007 comprehensive immigration reform bill); Darryl Fears, Illegal Immigrants
Targeted by States; Impasse on Hill Spurs New Laws, WASH. POST, June 25, 2007, at
A01 (describing states' frustrations with the federal government over the failure to pass
immigration reform legislation).
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The numbers are indeed staggering. The Pew Hispanic Center has
estimated the illegal immigrant population in the United States to be eleven
to twelve million. 5 The former Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) 6 has further estimated that the illegal immigrant population doubled
between 1990 and 2000. 7 Driving this huge influx of illegal immigration,
mostly from Mexico, has been the prospect of work-American employers
pay much more than Mexican employers-and the desire to be with family
members who have already arrived in the United States. 8 For some illegal
immigrants, however, the lure of America is its health care system. 9 Many
come to the United States seeking medical treatment that would otherwise be
unavailable to them, notwithstanding the fact that they often lack the means
to afford 10such health care in the absence of federally-mandated public
assistance.
While the costs of illegal immigration to America's health care system
have not been accurately determined," there is no doubt that they are
substantial. Some estimates put the figure in the hundreds of millions of
dollars in the southwest border states alone. 12 The financial pressure this has

5.

JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE

UNAUTHORIZED

MIGRANT

POPULATION

IN

THE

U.S.,

i

at

(2006),

http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf.
6. In 2003, the INS was dismantled and merged into other government agencies.
Enforcement of immigration laws became the responsibility of the agency for
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
See U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, About Us, http://www.ice.gov/about/index.htm (last visited Nov. 16,
2007); Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, New U.S. Agency Gets Cool Reception, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2003, at Al.
7.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS: QUESTIONS PERSIST

ABOUT THEIR IMPACT ON HOSPITALS' UNCOMPENSATED CARE COSTS 5 (2004).

8.

See

CTR.

FOR

IMMIGRATION

STUDIES,

ILLEGAL

IMMIGRATION,

http://www.cis.org/topics/illegalimmigration.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
9.

MGT OF AMERICA,

INC., MEDICAL EMERGENCY: COSTS OF UNCOMPENSATED

CARE IN SOUTHWEST BORDER COUNTIES 1 (2002); Michael Janofsky, Burden Grows for
Southwest Hospitals,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2003, at A14.
10.

See Janofsky, supra note 9.

11.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 3.

12.

MGT OF AMERICA, INC., supra note 9, at v; see Janofsky, supra note 9.
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placed on health care providers is enormous. In some cases, hospitals have
been forced to cut back on staffing and services; 13 in other cases, health care4
providers have found it necessary to shut down their facilities entirely.'
Given this untenable situation, the issue of publicly-funded health care for
illegal immigrants demands careful attention and consideration of the
practical extent to which the United States can and should meet the medical
needs of this population.
The policy of the federal government has generally been that illegal
immigrants are ineligible for federal, state, or local public benefits.15 One
notable exception found in the web of legislation limiting such benefits for
illegal immigrants has been that for "Emergency Medicaid., 16 According to
this provision, illegal immigrants are entitled to coverage under the
only for treatment for an "emergency medical
Medicaid program'

13.

See Janofsky, supra note 9.

14.

Madeleine Pelner Cosman, Illegal Aliens and American Medicine, 10 J. AM.
6 (2005).

PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS

15. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1621 (2000). This does not mean, however, that states are
prohibited from providing public benefits to illegal immigrants altogether. Section
1621 (d) provides that
an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States is eligible for
any State or local public benefit for which such alien would otherwise
be ineligible under subsection (a) of this section only through the
enactment of a State law after August 22, 1996, which affirmatively
provides for such eligibility.
8 U.S.C. § 1621(d).
16.

MGT OF AMERICA,

INC.,

supra note 9, at 8 & n.6 (2002).

17. Medicaid is a state-managed health care program that provides payment to health
care providers for the cost of providing treatment to certain categories of eligible
individuals who are otherwise unable to afford private care. MGT OF AMERICA, supra
note 9, at 12; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 444 (2d pocket ed. 2001). Funding for

Medicaid comes from both the states and the federal government through the use of
matching funds. CTR. FOR MEDICAID & STATE OPERATIONS, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID

SERVS.,

MEDICAID

AT-A-GLANCE

2005

5

(2005),

available

at

http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidGenlnfo/Downloads/MedicaidAtAGlance2005.pdf.
Federal matching funds are only provided if the state administering agency structures its
Medicaid program in conformity with the limits set forth by the federal government.
Health Res. & Servs. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Basic Description
of the Medicaid Program, http://www.hrsa.gov/medicaidprimer/ (last visited Nov. 16,
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condition,"' 8 and only where the patient is otherwise eligible for coverage
based on the particular state's requirements for Medicaid eligibility. 19 An
"emergency medical condition" is defined as "a medical condition
(including emergency labor and delivery) manifesting itself by acute
symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence
of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in
[one of three adverse results listed in the statute]."20 Although this provision
would seem to suggest a bright line easily interpreted by the states in the
administration of their Medicaid programs, in fact the definition of
"emergency medical condition" has proven to be somewhat ambiguous. In
cases brought by individuals and health care providers, the courts have come
up with somewhat conflicting interpretations of this term, leaving olen to
question the exact scope of Medicaid coverage for illegal immigrants.N
Most of the courts that have interpreted the emergency Medicaid
provision in question agree that an illegal immigrant who arrives at the
hospital with acute symptoms that could result in serious bodily harm or
death if not treated immediately is entitled to coverage under the Medicaid
program for the initial stabilizing treatment. 2 2 The courts diverge, however,
as to whether such treatment should extend beyond this initial care to poststabilization services. 2 3 Defining compensable emergency medical services

2007). Certain categorically needy groups must be covered under a state Medicaid plan,
while coverage for other medically needy groups is optional. MGT OF AMERICA, INC.,
supra note 9, at 12.
18.

42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v) (2000).

19.

Id.

20.

Id.

21. Compare Greenery Rehab. Group v. Hammon, 150 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 1998)
(holding that treatment of illegal immigrants for chronic symptoms beyond the point of
stabilization does not qualify for Medicaid coverage), with Szewczyk v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 881 A.2d 259 (Conn. 2005) (holding that "acute" symptoms do not necessarily
disappear when the patient is stabilized).
22.

E.g., Luna v. Div. ofSoc. Servs., 589 S.E.2d 917, 920 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).

23. Compare Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 628 S.E.2d 1, 5 (N.C. 2006) (holding that
the patient was not entitled to Medicaid coverage for post-stabilization chemotherapy
treatment), with Scottsdale Healthcare, Inc. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys.
Admin., 75 P.3d 91, 98 (Ariz. 2003) (holding that Medicaid coverage does not
necessarily terminate when the patient's initial injury is stabilized); see also Luna, 589
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one way or the other has a substantial impact on the budgets of public health
care providers. Since sixty-eight percent of the eleven to twelve million
illegal immigrants in the United States 24 are estimated to lack health
insurance, 25 one can imagine that the scope of coverage under Emergency
Medicaid for this segment of the population has far-reaching economic
effects. Furthermore, questioning whether the emergency exception should
apply only to stabilization treatment or also to services rendered beyond
stabilization (such as chemotherapy) forces one to consider the public policy
underlying the exception.
Section L.A of this article explores the Emergency Medicaid statute itself,
focusing on those provisions describing the treatment that health care
providers are required to provide to illegal immigrants if they wish to
participate in the Medicaid program. It also sets forth the relevant
implementing regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and
Human Services. Section I.B describes a number of cases, both federal and
state, that have addressed the issue of whether an "emergency medical
condition" encompasses services beyond merely stabilization, or whether
stabilization ends reimbursable coverage for illegal immigrants under the
Medicaid program.
Section II focuses on three major considerations
affected by the scope of coverage under both a broad and a narrow definition
of "emergency medical condition" and attempts to demonstrate how these
considerations should inform the interpretation of the Emergency Medicaid
provision. Finally, Section III summarizes the conclusions reached in
Section 11 and briefly explores the possible future of Medicaid coverage for
illegal immigrants.
Throughout, the author argues that the phrase
"emergency medical condition" should be construed as extending to
treatment even beyond stabilization because such an interpretation best
serves the purposes of the Act of which the provision was a part, ensures
greater deference towards those best-positioned to determine whether an
emergency medical conditions exists, and avoids a situation where health
care providers and states are burdened with the negative impact of an
ambiguous federal statute.

S.E.2d at 920 (indicating that the issue was whether chemotherapy treatments and postsurgical care were covered by Medicaid).
24.

PASSEL, supra note 5, at i.

25.

RAND CORP., RAND STUDY FINDS UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS ARE MOST

LIKELY To BE UNINSURED (2005), http://www.rand.org/news/press.05/1 I. 10.html.
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I. BACKGROUND

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(b)
In July 1986, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York struck down a federal regulation restricting Medicaid benefits to
those lawfully admitted for permanent residence or permanently residing in
the United States under color of law, rejecting the idea that alienage was a
26
In
lawful consideration in making determinations of Medicaid eligibility.
Omnibus
the
of
part
as
included
legislation,
passed
Congress
response,
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, denying Medicaid payments to states
that provide health care services to illegal immigrants with the exception of
27
The relevant provisions,
treatment for an "emergency medical condition."
28
read:
1396b(v),
§
U.S.C.
42
in
as codified
(v) Medical assistance to aliens not lawfully admitted for permanent
residence.
(1) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section,
except as provided in paragraph (2), no payment may be made to
a State under this section for medical assistance furnished to an
alien who is not lawfully admitted for permanent residence or
otherwise permanently residing in the United States under color
of law.
(2) Payment shall be made under this section for care and
services that are furnished to an alien described in paragraph (1)
only if(A) such care and services are necessary for the treatment
of an emergency medical condition of the alien,
(B) such alien otherwise meets the eligibility requirements
for medical assistance under the State plan approved under
this subchapter [42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v] (other than the
requirement of the receipt of aid or assistance under
subchapter IV [42 U.S.C. §§ 601-687], supplemental
security income benefits under subchapter XVI [42 U.S.C.
§§ 1381-1385], or a State supplementary payment), and

26. Szewczyk v. Dep't of Soc. Servs, 881 A.2d 259, 278 (Conn. 2005) (Sullivan,
C.J., dissenting) (citing Lewis v. Gross, 663 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)); H.R. REP.
No. 99-1012, at 399 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3868, 4044.
27. Omnibus Budget Rehabilitation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9406, 100
Stat. 1874, 2057-58 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
28.

42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v) (2000).
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(C) such care and services are not related to an organ
transplant procedure.
(3) For purposes of this subsection, the term "emergency
medical condition" means a medical condition (including
emergency labor and delivery) manifesting itself by acute
symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that
the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be
expected to result in(A) placing the patient's health in serious jeopardy,
(B) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(C) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.
Pursuant to congressional authorization,
the Secretary of Health and
Human Services promulgated regulations that basically mirrored the
language of the federal statute. 30 The most notable difference was the
addition of the words "after sudden onset" in the definition of emergency
services, so that section (3) read, "[t]he alien has, after sudden onset, a
medical condition." 3' This language was added after several commenters
expressed concern that the term "emergency medical condition" had been
inadequately defined.3 2 The Department of Health and Human Services
declined to define the term with more precision, however, stating that "the
broad definition allows States to interpret and further define the services
available to aliens covered by [the emergency medical condition exception].
in a consistent and proper manner supported by professional medical
judgment."33 The final regulations, therefore, made relatively clear when
emergency medical treatment would begin, but left open the question of
when those services would no longer be available, i.e., when the state would
no longer be reimbursed for providing those services to illegal immigrants.
B. Case History
Both federal and state courts have grappled with the precise meaning of
the words "emergency medical condition," and they have come up with
29.

Id. § 1302.

30.

42 C.F.R. § 440.255 (2006).

31.

Id. (emphasis added).

32. Medicaid Program; Eligibility of Aliens for Medicaid, 55 Fed. Reg. 36813,
36816 (Sept. 7, 1990) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 440).
33.

Id.
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conflicting interpretations that leave open to question the extent of
emergency services available to illegal immigrants under the Medicaid
program. 34 While the courts generally agree that the provision of emergency
services to illegal immigrants under § 1396b(v) is conditioned on the initial
manifestation of an "acute" symptom, the nature of treatment (or lack
point of stabilization has been a source of considerable
thereof) beyond
35 the
disagreement.
While some courts have held that § 1396b(v) only provides benefits for
treatment of a medical emergency up until stabilization, and not for
continuing care resulting from that same injury, others have held that §
1396b(v) authorizes ongoing treatment for an emergency medical condition
so long as the absence of care would result in one of the three negative
results listed in the statute, regardless of whether or not the patient was
stabilized. 36 Therefore, the difference in Medicaid coverage for illegal
immigrants, depending on one's interpretation of "emergency medical
condition," is enormous, and given the large numbers of illegal immigrants
37
that are not covered by health insurance, any future resolution of the matter
will have profound effects on this segment of American society.
In 1998, the Second Circuit in Greenery RehabilitationGroup v. Hammon
had occasion to interpret the extent of Medicaid coverage for illegal
immigrants and the meaning of the emergency medical condition
exception. 38 In that case, three patients, two of them illegal immigrants,
"suffered sudden and serious head injuries [requiring] immediate treatment"
and required ongoing treatment beyond initial stabilization that included the

34. See Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
State Statutes Limiting or BarringPublic Health Care to Indigent Aliens, 113 A.L.R. 5th

95 (2004).
35. See Hospital Reimbursement for Treating Aliens Is Not Limited to PreCompare Scottsdale
Stabilization Treatment, 72 U.S. LAW WEEK 1122 (2003).
75 P.3d 91 (Ariz.
Admin.,
Sys.
Containment
Cost
Care
Health
v.
Ariz.
Inc.
Healthcare,

2003) (holding that existence of an "emergency medical condition" does not necessarily
end with stabilization of the initial injury), with Greenery Rehab. Group, Inc. v.
Hammon, 150 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the patients' emergency condition
ended upon stabilization).
36. Hospital Reimbursementfor Treating Aliens Is Not Limited to Pre-Stabilization
Treatment, supra note 35.
37.

RAND CORP., supra note 25.

38.

Greenery Rehab. Group, 150 F.3d at 226.
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assistance of nursing staff with the most basic human needs. 39 The issue
before the court was whether such conditions, described as "chronic,"
constituted emergency medical conditions for purposes of Medicaid
eligibility. 40 The court emphatically held that that they did not. 4 1 In
analyzing this provision, the court emphasized that the acute symptoms
could not exist independently of the emergency medical condition. 4: For
that reason, the "long term nursing and maintenance care" required by the
patients failed to satisfy the plain meaning of the statute, and the
rehabilitation facility that provided the treatment was therefore not entitled
to federal reimbursement for the care provided beyond
stabilization, which
43
marked the end of the emergency medical condition.
Eight years later, and relying heavily on Greenery, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina in Diaz v. Division of Social Services held that Federal
Medicaid reimbursement for treating an illegal immigrant's emergency
medical condition extended only to acute symptoms and only up to the point
of stabilization.4 4 The petitioner in that case, unlike the patients in
Greenery, received treatment not for a condition resulting from traumatic
injury, but rather for acute lymphocytic leukemia. 45
Chemotherapy
treatments were administered off and on for a period of approximately two
years. 46 Although the court did note in its opinion that the patient would
eventually have manifested an emergency medical condition in the absence
of treatment beyond the initial course provided, the fact that he had been
stabilized meant that Medicaid coverage was no longer available from that

39. Id. at 228-29. One patient had suffered severe head injuries as the result of an
automobile accident. Id. at 228. Another had been shot in the head. Id. The third

sustained serious head injuries after being beaten. Id. at 229.
40.

Id.at 231.

41.

Id. at 233.

42.

Id. at 232.

43.

Id. at 232-33.

44.

Diaz v. Div. ofSoc. Servs, 628 S.E.2d I, 5 (N.C. 2006).

45.

Id. at 2.

46.

Id.
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point forward.4 7 The reasoning of Greenery had apparently prevailed, even
with an explicit acknowledgment that the petitioner's condition would
eventually necessitate treatment that would be covered by Medicaid as an
emergency medical condition.
Several other state cases, most notably in Arizona, have interpreted the
scope of the emergency medical condition exception providing Medicaid
coverage for illegal immigrants to go beyond merely stabilization. The first
of these, and indeed the first case to interpret § 1396b(v), was Mercy
Healthcare Arizona, Inc. v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment
System. 4 8
The patient in that case had been severely injured in an
automobile accident. 49 After initial treatment at the hospital, he was later
transferred to a "skilled nursing care facility, ' 50 although at the time he "was
non-verbal, could not move his lower extremities, had a gastrointestinal tube
for feeding, and had a tracheostomy." 5 ' The Arizona Court of Appeals
rejected the State Medicaid program's argument that the patient's Medicaid
coverage ended at the point of stabilization. 52 Instead, the court held that

47.

Id. at 5.

48. Mercy Healthcare Ariz., Inc. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 887
P.2d 625 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); Scottsdale Healthcare, Inc. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost
Containment Sys. Admin., 75 P.3d 91, 95 (Ariz. 2003).
49.

Mercy HealthcareAriz., Inc., 887 P.2d at 627.

50. A "skilled nursing facility" is defined under the Social Security Act as an
institution that
(1) is primarily engaged in providing to residentsskilled nursing care and related services for residents who require
medical or nursing care, or
rehabilitation services for the rehabilitation of injured, disabled, or sick
persons, and is not primarily for the care and treatment of mental
diseases;
(2) has in effect a transfer agreement (meeting the requirements of
section 1395x(1) of this title) with one or more hospitals having
agreements in effect under section 1395cc of this title; and
(3) meets the requirements for a skilled nursing facility described in
subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3 (2000).
51.

Mercy Healthcare Ariz., Inc., 887 P.2d at 627.

52.

Id. at 628.
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[t]he statute.., mandates that the medical condition manifest itself by
"an acute symptom (including severe pain)." The statute then
mandates that [Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System] must
cover services for treatment of that medical condition so long as
absence of immediate treatment for that condition "could reasonably
be expected
to result in" one of the three consequences defined by
53
statute.

According to the court, therefore, the statute only required that the
emergency medical condition manifest itself initially by acute symptoms,
and that Medicaid coverage for the condition would continue so long as the
withholding of treatment "'could reasonably be expected to result in' one of
the three consequences defined by statute."
The Arizona Supreme Court finally interpreted the emergency medical
condition provision for itself in 2003 in Scottsdale Healthcare, Inc. v.
55
Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System Administration.
Three
cases had been consolidated on appeal, and although their factual
circumstances varied significantly, in each case the patient had suffered
serious injuries but had been moved "from an acute care ward to a
rehabilitative type of ward." 56 The court adopted the reasoning of the Mercy
court.57 In doing so, it pointed out that the court had not presented a test for
determining exactly when the emergency medical condition had ended.58
But in any case it rejected the emphasis on stabilization set forth in Greenery

53.

Id. at 629.

54. Scottsdale Healthcare, Inc. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. Admin.,
75 P.3d 91, 95 (Ariz. 2003) (citing Mercy Healthcare Ariz., Inc. v. Ariz. Health Care
Cost Containment Sys., 887 P.2d 625, 629 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)).
55.

Id at 91.

56. Id. at 94. All patients involved were illegal immigrants. Id. In the first case, the
patient had suffered serious back and neck injuries and required the assistance of others
to sit and stand. Id. at 94 n.3. In the second case, one patient had been involved in a
serious car accident and "when transferred had difficulty swallowing and had an impaired
cough reflex which placed him at high risk for aspiration" while two other patients were
fed through a tube and required constant medical attention. Id. In the third case, the
patient had been shot in the abdomen, leaving him with a gaping wound that required
several surgeries as well as constant attention to monitor for infection. Id.
57.

Id. at 95-97.

58.

Id. at 95.

160
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59
Rehabilitation Group v. Hammon. Instead, the court stated that "the focus
must be on whether the patient's current medical condition ...is a nonchronic condition presently manifesting itself by acute symptoms of
sufficient severity such that the absence of immediate medical treatment
could result in one of the three adverse consequences listed in [§
1396b(v)].",6° As a result, the Arizona Supreme Court, while recognizing
that the statute only encompassed Medicaid coverage for an emergency
medical condition marked by "acute" symptoms, also recognized that the
manifestation of acute symptoms and medical stabilization were not
mutually exclusive concepts; therefore, stabilization should not be the
condition and
touchstone for determining the end of the emergency medical
61
facility.
treating
the
for
reimbursement
the loss of federal
Carefully reviewing the case law that had preceded it, the Supreme Court
of Connecticut weighed in on the matter in 2005 in Szewczyk v. Department
of Social Services. The plaintiff had overstayed his visa, after which time
he developed symptoms of severe pain and nausea similar to those
63
experienced by the patient in Diaz. He was later diagnosed with acute
myelogenous leukemia and his doctors administered chemotherapy for
64
The court reversed the appellate court's
approximately one month.
determination that the plaintiff was not entitled to any Medicaid benefits for
this treatment. 65 The court adopted a standard slightly different from both
that found in Greenery and Scottsdale, but nonetheless interpreted the phrase
"emergency medical condition" to mean more than simply a manifestation
of acute symptoms that necessarily ends when the patient has been
stabilized. 66 Unlike in Scottsdale, the court here did not believe that

59. Scottsdale Healthcare, Inc. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. Admin.,
75 P.3d 91, 96-97 (Ariz. 2003).
60.

Id.at 98 (emphasis added).

61.

Id. at 97-98.

62.

Szewczyk v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 881 A.2d 259 (Conn. 2005).

63.

Id.; see Diaz v. Div.

64.

Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 262.

65.

Id.at 274.

66.

Id. at 270.

of Soc. Servs., 628 S.E.2d I (N.C. 2006).
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Greenery had placed excessive emphasis on whether the patient had been
stabilized. It did, however, agree with the Arizona Supreme Court's view
that the existence of an emergency medical condition "does not focus solely
68
Thus, the
on the condition of the patient at one instant in time."
Connecticut court seemed to agree that the Greenery standard was
appropriate, but reached the same conclusion as in Scottsdale-that acute
symptoms, and therefore coverage for an emergency medical condition, did
not necessarily evaporate when the patient was stabilized.
ANALYSIS
11.

As is evident from the preceding discussion of the state and federal cases
that have addressed the scope of § 1396b(v), the precise definition of
"emergency medical condition" bears enormously on the scope of coverage
available to illegal immigrants under Emergency Medicaid. And given the
9
staggering number of illegal immigrants without health insurance,6 the
implications for health care providers and the states in which they are
located are similarly daunting. The impact has already been felt in some
parts of the country, particularly the border states of the Southwest, where
emergency treatment for illegal immigrants has forced some providers to cut
Under these circumstances, more
back on services or close entirely.
universal acceptance of the broad definition of "emergency medical
condition," encompassing care beyond merely stabilization (such as that
adopted in Arizona), would alleviate some of the pressure being placed on
states bearing the burden of illegal immigration.
Such an approach would have a number of benefits. First, it would ensure
that § 1396b-passed as part of a budget reduction act l-remains true to its
original purpose of reducing government expenditures. Second, the broader
"beyond-stabilization" definition of emergency medical condition would

67.

See id.

68. Szewczyk v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 881 A.2d 259, 270 (Conn. 2005) (citing
Scottsdale Healthcare, Inc. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. Admin., 75 P.3d
91, 98 n.9 (Ariz. 2003)).
69.

RAND CORP., supra note 25.

70.

Janofsky, supra note 9.

Statement by President Ronald Reagan upon Signing H.R. 5300, 22 WEEKLY
71.
COMP. PRES. DoC. 1421 (Oct. 27, 1986); see also Szewczyk v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 881
A.2d 259, 278 (Conn. 2005) (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting).
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afford greater deference to health care providers, who are best-positioned to
determine whether an emergency medical condition persists beyond the
initial stabilizing treatment provided in an emergency room. Third, the
broader definition both ensures that the federal government-the entity
responsible for control of the nation's borders-remains responsible for
weaknesses in its enforcement of immigration law and that the states are not
forced to bear the consequences of either those enforcement weaknesses or
the latent ambiguity of the federal statute.
A. The Purpose of§ 1396b(v) Is Not Well-Served by a Narrow, StabilizationOnly Interpretationof Treatmentfor an "Emergency Medical Condition"
Despite its obvious impact on America's health care providers, state and
local governments, and several million people living within the United
States, the legislative history of § 1396b(v) is rather thin. It does show,
however, that § 1396b(v) was passed in response to a U.S. District Court
ruling that struck down Medicaid regulations limiting benefits to lawfully
admitted aliens. 72 In its conference report, the House Budget Committee
made clear that "nothing in Medicaid law should be construed to require a
State to offer coverage to aliens who are not lawfully admitted for
permanent residence or otherwise permanently residing in the U.S. under
color of law." 73 Not surprisingly, this statement was consistent with the
overall purpose of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of
1986-the larger statute of which § 1396b(v) had been a part-which had
been to pull the reins on government spending. 74 It was thus clear that
Congress had acted in large part to eliminate the costs the federal
government might otherwise incur were the ruling of the U.S. District Court
to be adopted nationwide.
Given both the OBRA's general purpose of reducing government
spending and the specific purpose of § 1396b(v) to restrict Medicaid benefits
H.R. REP. No. 99-1012, at 399 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986
4044; see also Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 278 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting)
(citing Lewis v. Gross, 663 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd in part sub nom. Lewis
v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 2001)). The House Conference Report cited the
district court as stating that Congress "knew how to impose alienage requirements on
social welfare programs when it intended, and its refusal to impose such a requirement on
Medicaid should be respected." H.R. REP. No. 99-1012, at 399.
72.

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3868,

73.

H.R. REP. No. 99-1012, at 399.

74. Statement by President Ronald Reagan upon Signing H.R. 5300, 22 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. Doc. 1421 (Oct. 27, 1986); see also Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 278 (Sullivan,
C.J., dissenting).
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to illegal immigrants, the proper focus in interpreting the scope of the
emergency medical condition exception with regards to treating illegal
immigrants should be on cost reduction. This being the case, any effort to
narrow the definition of "emergency medical condition" according to
whether or not a patient has been stabilized misses the point. In fact, it may
prove more costly than if a broader definition is applied, encompassing the
initial injury or illness (manifesting itself by acute symptoms) as well as
continuing symptoms that may result in one of the three statutorily defined
negative results.
The problem with applying a narrow, stabilization-only definition of
emergency medical condition is that it fails to consider the possibility of a
given patient's condition regressing and resulting in one of the three
negative results listed in the statute if treatment is withheld after the point of
stabilization. That is, applying a narrow definition focused primarily on
stabilization fails to consider that sending a patient on his way after the
initial injury or illness is stabilized may result in that patient returning to the
emergency room for precisely the same condition soon after being
discharged. This problem was noted by the Diaz court, which observed that
"if petitioner had not received chemotherapy treatments, he would have
eventually regressed into a state of an emergency medical condition. 75
While ultimately withholding benefits because the petitioner did not require
immediate treatment beyond stabilization to avoid the negative results listed
in the statute, the court in Diaz nonetheless acknowledged that the absence
of treatment might eventually result in an emergency medical condition
anyway. 76 Such a conclusion does not serve the OBRA's overarching
purpose of reducing government expenditures. Instead, it simply puts health
care providers in the business of "putting out fires" rather than treating
emergency medical conditions in a way that diminishes the likelihood that
the illegal immigrant will return to the emergency room for treatment for
exactly the same condition.7 7 For that reason, focusing on stabilization and

75.

Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 628 S.E.2d 1, 5 (N.C. 2006).

76.

Id.

77. One doctor in Arizona, noting the financial pressure on hospitals in his region
caused by treating illegal immigrants, pointed out that many hospital officials are now
forced to provide stabilization services rather than treatment of patients' illnesses. For
example, doctors may decide to stabilize a patient who turned up at the hospital
exhibiting signs of gallstones, rather than conducting surgery to remove the stones. See
Janofsky, supra note 9. Nevertheless, the argument that stabilizing such a patient rather
than treating his condition is economical would be difficult to sustain unless one assumes
that this patient would expire before his next visit to the emergency room. The
possibility of future emergency room admissions for patients who previously received
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whether or not a patient would immediately expire upon discharge from the
hospital may not be the most cost-effective approach to this exception in
Medicaid law for treating an otherwise ineligible population.
Given
OBRA's cost-savings objective, this would be contrary to the spirit of the
legislation.
Despite the possible increased costs involved in stabilizing and restabilizing a patient to satisfy the emergency medical condition exception,
one could argue that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
has intended in its regulations to limit emergency treatment for illegal
immigrants to end at stabilization. The argument is not entirely without
merit. In 1990, HHS observed that it was making a minor change in the
definition of emergency medical condition to harmonize the definition in §
1396b(v) with that found in the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act (EMTALA).
The emergency medical condition provision in
that statute explicitly provides that if a patient arrives at the hospital and
medical personnel determine that the patient is suffering from an emergency
medical condition, the hospital must provide the treatment necessary to
stabilize the patient. 79 This cross-reference to EMTALA could therefore be
construed as indicating that Congress intended to provide emergency
services to illegal immigrants under § 1396b(v) only up to the point of
stabilization, as required of hospitals in EMTALA. 80

only stabilizing treatment was also hinted at by a doctor who testified in connection with
a 2004 case in North Carolina. The doctor "expressed her opinion that Medicaid should
not pay after 3 January 2000, because petitioner 'had been stabilized and that an abrupt
onset would be necessary for each admission to qualify as an emergency medical
condition."' Luna v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 589 S.E.2d 917, 921 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).

78. The minor change involved was the addition of the words "after sudden onset" to
the description of covered emergency services found in the regulations, which otherwise
mirrored the language of § 1367b(v)(3). Medicaid Program; Eligibility of Aliens for
Medicaid, 55 Fed. Reg. 36813, 36816 (Sept. 7, 1990) (to be codified at pt. 435-36, 440);
42 C.F.R. § 440.255 (2006).
79. Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act § 1867, 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd (2000).
80. Szewczyk v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 881 A.2d 259, 280-81 (Conn. 2005) (Sullivan,
C.J., dissenting). This argument was not lost on the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Connecticut, who in his dissenting opinion in Szewczyk forcefully asserted that the

definition of "emergency medical condition" found in § 1396b(v) was intended to be
same as that found in EMTALA. His argument explored in great detail the legislative
history of EMTALA and addressed other sections of the Social Security Act before he

arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff should not have been entitled to Medicaid
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In further support of the stabilization-only argument, one might observe
that it would be an odd result for EMTALA, an act intended to expand
treatment opportunities for individuals who might otherwise be turned
away, 8 ' to offer less coverage than § 1396b(v), a provision designed to
8
restrict coverage for illegal immigrants. 2 Indeed, it would appear that in
jurisdictions adopting a broader definition of "emergency medical
condition" (e.g. Arizona83 and Connecticut 84), an illegal immigrant might be
entitled to Emergency Medicaid coverage for treatment of an emergency
medical condition, but the hospital would have no obligation to treat him
under EMTALA because he has already been stabilized.
The apparent contradiction described above dissipates when one considers
the public policy underlying both EMTALA and Emergency Medicaid
coverage for illegal immigrants. The Medicaid provisions in § 1396b(v)
form an exception to a public benefit program that is otherwise not available
85
In fact,
to those who are not lawful residents of the United States.
Congress has made quite clear its policy judgment that illegal immigrants
should not be eligible for any state or local public benefit (except for limited
86
exceptions, which include Emergency Medicaid under § 1396b(v)). When
an illegal immigrant seeks treatment for an emergency medical condition,
87
federal funding ceases when that condition no longer exists. On the other
hand, EMTALA does not address the availability of benefits per se. It only
states that when an individual arrives at the hospital seeking treatment for an
emergency medical condition, the hospital must provide treatment necessary
benefits because he had not been suffering from an emergency medical condition when
he was admitted for treatment for leukemia. Id at 275, 278, 280.
81. Id. at 279-80 (citing 131 Cong. Rec., Pt. 21, 28,568 (1985) (statement of Sen.
Durenberger)).
82. See H.R. REP. No. 99-1012, at 399 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3868, 4044.
83. Scottsdale Healthcare, Inc. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. Admin.,
75 P.3d 91 (Ariz. 2003).
84.

Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 259.

85.

42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v) (2000).

86.

Id. § 1621.

87.

Id. § 1396b(v).
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to stabilize the emergency condition and may not transfer the patient to
another facility unless he or she has been stabilized (with certain
exceptions).
The statute does not contemplate that public assistance will
necessarily end. EMTALA only guarantees that hospitals will not engage in
the practice of "patient dumping" by refusing to treat indigent patients or
those who would otherwise depend on public insurance programs to pay for
their treatment. 89 In other words, EMTALA protects patients who may still
have coverage under Medicaid after they are stabilized and their emergency
medical condition has ended; however, § 1396b(v) clearly indicates that
public assistance for illegal immigrants will stop after their emergency
medical condition has ended. 90
It should also be noted that the word "stabilization" does not appear
anywhere in the language of § 1396b(v). 9 1 While EMTALA expressly
requires health care providers to provide "treatment as may be required to
stabilize the [emergency] medical condition," 92 § 1396b(v) makes no such
explicit reference to stabilization, 93 despite the fact that the definition of an
emergency medical condition in both statutes is nearly identical.94 As
indicated earlier, this would suggest that Congress was concerned with
stabilization in the context of EMTALA, but not concerned with
stabilization in the context of Emergency Medicaid. 95 EMTALA directs
health care providers to stabilize individuals arriving with an emergency
medical condition. 96 Section 1396b(v) provides reimbursement to states that

88.

Id. § 1395dd.

89. EMTALA.com, Frequently Asked Questions about the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), http://www.emtala.com/faq.htm (last
visited Nov. 16, 2007).
90.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v).

91.

See id.

92. Id.§ 1395dd.
93.

Id.§ 1396b(v).

94.

Compare id.§ 1396b(v)(3) (Emergency Medicaid), with id.§ 1395dd(e)(1)

(EMTALA).
95. See Scottsdale Healthcare, Inc. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys.
Admin., 75 P.3d 91, 97 n.6 (Ariz. 2003).
96.

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.
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provide treatment (no mention of stabilization) to an illegal immigrant for an
emergency medical condition. 97 It therefore appears that while the definition
statutes, the scope of
of an emergency medical condition is the same in both
98
treatment contemplated in each of them is different.
Finally, apart from any concern about the compatibility of § 1396b(v)
with the overall budget-reducing objectives of OBRA, or the relationship of
§ 1396b(v) to EMTALA, critics of an expansive reading of § 1396b(v) could
point to the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (Welfare Reform Act) 99 as evidence of Congress' intent to
restrict benefits provided to illegal immigrants. Indeed, Title IV of the
Welfare Reform Act explicitly states that "an alien who is not a qualified
alien (as defined in section 431) is not eligible for any federal public benefit
[with the exception of emergency medical procedures as described in §
1396b(v)(3)]."'0 The Act further states that "it is a compelling government
interest to remove the incentive for illegal immigration provided by the
availability of public benefits." 10 1 The legislative history of this Act also
makes it clear that, aside from reducing the incentive for illegal immigration,
Congress further intended to exclude illegal immigrants presently in the
2
Given this clear statement of
United States from public welfare benefits.'
a broad reading of the
how
wonder
might
one
policy,
congressional
Emergency Medicaid provision can square with any reasonable
interpretation of the Welfare Reform Act.
Despite the seeming contradiction between a post-stabilization reading of
§ 1396b(v) and the Welfare Reform Act, the two statutes need not defeat
each other's purpose. Congress well understood this when it passed the
1996 Act, making an exception for the general rule of benefit exclusion by
carving out an exception for the treatment of an "emergency medical

97.

Id.§ 1396b(v).

98.

See discussion infra Part ll.B.

99. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of, inter alia, 8
and 42 U.S.C.).

100.

8 U.S.C. § 1611 (2000).

101.

Id. § 1601.

102.

H.R. REP. No 104-651, at 1442 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183,

2501.

168
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condition as defined in [§ 1396b(v)].', 10 3 This cross-reference would seem
to indicate that Congress intended to incorporate a definition of "emergency
medical condition" not based on stabilization alone. Congress could have
referenced the more restrictive language in EMTALA as well, but it did not.
Nor has subsequent legislation clarified the intended meaning of "emergency
medical condition" in any meaningful way. Thus, a broader reading of §
1396b(v) need not conflict with the Welfare Reform Act, and the impact of
that Act, because its goals will continue to be met, need not be weakened.
Illegal immigrants will continue to be denied public welfare benefits
generally, a policy that clearly serves to reduce the incentive to enter the
United States illegally and penalizes those illegal immigrants already here.
To the extent that a broader, post-stabilization reading of § 1396b(v)
frustrates the goals of the Welfare Reform Act, one need only remember that
§ 1396b(v) forms an explicit and narrow exception to a very broad range of
benefits that might otherwise be available to illegal immigrants had the 1996
legislation not been implemented.
B. The BroaderDefinition of "Emergency Medical Condition"
AppropriatelyAffords GreaterDeference to Health Care Providers
Both HHS and the courts appear to have shown substantial deference
towards health care providers in determining the existence of an emergency
medical condition on the facts of a given case. 104 HHS specifically felt that
such an approach was appropriate and stated as much after commenters on
the implementing regulations expressed concern that the phrase "emergency
medical condition" was too vague and needed to be clarified. 0 5 HHS stated
that
the broad definition allows States to interpret and further define the
services available to aliens covered by [§ 1396b(v)] which are any
services necessary to treat an emergency medical condition in a...
manner supported by professional medical judgment. Further, the
significant variety of potential emergencies ...

are so varied that it is

neither practical nor possible to define with more precision all those

103.

8 U.S.C. § 1611.

104.

See, e.g., Scottsdale Healthcare, Inc. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys.

Admin., 75 P.3d 91, 98 (Ariz. 2003); Medicaid Program; Eligibility of Aliens for
Medicaid, 55 Fed. Reg. 36,813, 36,816 (Sept. 7, 1990) (to be codified at pt. 440).

105.

Medicaid Program; Eligibility of Aliens for Medicaid, 55 Fed. Reg. at 36,816.
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conditions which [sic] will be considered an emergency medical
condition. °6
In deliberately choosing to accept and promulgate a broadly defined
regulation, therefore, HHS implicitly recognized that doctors and state
medical advisors, rather than federal agencies or courts, were best positioned
to determine whether an individual suffered from an emergency medical
condition. 10 7 This approach-deference towards the judgment of medical
professionals and state advisory boards-is wholly consistent with sound
medical practice, insofar as health care providers are ethically bound to
provide necessary treatment, °8 and the approach ensures that these
providers are able to exercise their informed medical discretion within the
bounds of the statute.
An examination of the cases, applying a narrow, stabilization-only
reading of § 1396b(v), reveals the disconnect such an interpretation might
create between health care professionals on the one hand and the nation's
courts on the other. For example, in Greenery Rehabilitation Group, the
court undertook an extensive examination of the language of § 1396b(v)
before reaching its conclusion that the patients treated by the appellee were
not entitled to Medicaid coverage. 10 9 Part of the court's inquiry involved
discussing the dictionary definitions of the key words found in the
Emergency Medicaid provision, such as "acute," "manifest," "immediate,"
and "emergency." 1 0 After this discussion, the court stated that it had "some
doubt as to whether [the patients'] health
would be jeopardized by the
'I
absence of 'immediate medical attention." II
Doubt based in part on a court's understanding of medical terminology
drawn from dictionaries would seem to thwart HHS policy. This policy
allows states to apply a broad definition of emergency medical condition and
106.

Id. (emphasis added).

107.

See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 13.

108.

MGT OF AMERICA, INC., supra note 9, at 1; see also Nat'l Ass'n of Pub. Hosps.

& Health Sys., Benefits Restoration for Legal Immigrants (Mar. 2003),
http://www.naph.org/Template.cfm?Section=Immigration&Template='/ContentManagem
entlContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=3070 ("NAPH members are committed to providing
health care services to all patients regardless of ability to pay or immigration status.").
109.

Greenery Rehab. Group v. Hammon, 150 F.3d 226, 232-33 (2d Cir. 1998).

110.

Id. at 232.

III.

ld.at233.
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reimburse State Medicaid agencies for "any services necessary to treat an
emergency medical condition in a consistent and proper manner supported
by professional medical judgment."' "12 This problem would of course be
most significant in cases where the State Medicaid agency and/or the
treating physicians might believe that a given patient's condition falls within
the definition of an emergency medical condition and where a court
3
interpreting the provision holds otherwise." Furthermore, it is important to
remember the difference between determining the scope of Emergency
Medicaid coverage on the facts of a given case and the scope of the law
itself. It is one thing for the courts to apply an expansive interpretation of
"emergency medical condition," allowing for the reimbursement of poststabilization treatment in accordance with sound medical judgment. It is
quite another for the courts to apply a narrow, stabilization-only
interpretation of that same provision, possibly withholding treatment of a
condition that health care providers would otherwise have classified as an
14
emergency medical condition.'

112. Medicaid Program; Eligibility of Aliens for Medicaid, 55 Fed. Reg. 36813,
36816 (Sept. 7, 1990) (to be codified at pt. 440).
113. To be fair, this was not the case in Greenery Rehabilitation Group. In its
opinion, the Second Circuit relied in part on the testimony of the two treating physicians
involved in the matter. One of the physicians stated his understanding of an emergency
medical condition as referring to "the care you give to stabilize the patient, I could
consider that up to the stabilization as emergency care." This interpretation of
"emergency medical condition" had also apparently been recognized by the New York
City Human Resources Administration, the agency responsible for administering the
Medicaid program in the New York City area. In effect, then, the court was simply
reaffirming the decision made by the administrative agency, although its mode of
interpretation would clearly conflict with the notion of allowing a broader interpretation
for the purposes of permitting medical professionals to exercise their professional
discretion within the reasonable scope of the statute. Greenery Rehab. Group, 150 F.3d
at 229, 232.
114. In Mercy Healthcare Arizona, for example, the appellant health care provider
sought reimbursement from the state Medicaid administrator for expenses that the
provider argued were related to treatment for an emergency medical condition. Mercy
Healthcare Ariz., Inc. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 887 P.2d 625, 628
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). Although it was the state administrator that initially defined the
Emergency Medicaid provision narrowly, rather than a court, id. at 27, one can still see
the tension that may result between physicians and either Medicaid administrators or
courts where § 1396b(v) is construed narrowly to encompass only pre-stabilization
treatment. Resolving this tension in favor of the narrow construction may, therefore,
result in health care providers not being compensated for expenses related to the
treatment of an emergency medical condition, at least as defined by those in direct
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Whether State Medicaid administrators or health care providers choose to
classify a given condition as compensable under Emergency Medicaid or
not, a broader interpretation of the term "emergency medical condition" at
least allows for physicians to continue providing needed care-care that in
their judgment consists of emergency services-without concern that the law
will constrain their providing this service. This is not to say that health care
providers should not be subject to the clear intent of Congress that illegal
immigrants not be provided with services beyond those described as treating
an emergency medical condition. Rather, this merely ensures that this
narrow exception is interpreted in accordance with the medical discretion
15
HHS has determined deserves considerable deference."
C. A Narrow Interpretationof "Emergency Medical Condition" Results in
States andHealth Care Providers Bearingthe Consequences of an
Ambiguous FederalStatute in an Area in Which the Federal Government
Exercises Sole Authority
According to a 2000 opinion poll, an overwhelming majority of
Americans felt that the costs of providing emergency medical treatment to
6
illegal immigrants should be borne by the federal government alone.11
Other polls also reveal the widely held belief that not only should the federal
government cover expenditures for emergency treatment of illegal
immigrants, but that illegal immigrants should in fact be entitled to such
treatment. 117 At least one state governor, Janet Napolitano of Arizona, has
expressed a similar sentiment. 118 Indeed, it is the job of the federal
government, not state and local government, both to secure the U.S. border
and to enforce immigration law. 119 One could therefore make a reasonable

contact with the patients and thus in the best position to determine whether an individual

in fact suffered from such a condition.
115. See Medicaid Program; Eligibility of Aliens for
36816; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 13.
116.

MGT OF AMERICA, INC., supra note 9, at iii.

117.

Id. at4.

Medicaid, 55 Fed. Reg. at

118. Governor Napolitano has expressed disappointment with the federal
government's failure to provide hospitals with sufficient funds to ease the burden of
providing care to illegal immigrants. Janofsky, supra note 9.
119.

MGT

OF AMERICA, INC., supra

note 9, at 1.
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argument that the federal government should bear the expense of providing
emergency care for individuals who have entered the United States illegally
and evaded immigration law.
Given the tension between the responsibilities of the federal government
and the pressures of providing emergency health care to illegal immigrants
faced by states and health care providers, a narrow interpretation of the
Emergency Medicaid exception for illegal immigrants only strains the
state/federal relationship further. It should be noted that physicians are
120
It
obligated, both ethically and legally, to provide necessary health care.
should also be noted that the Emergency Medicaid exception for illegal
immigrants is textually ambiguous, as is evident from a reading of the
These circumstances combine to create substantial
language itself.
unfairness to health care providers when the exception is construed narrowly
While
to permit reimbursement only for pre-stabilization treatment.
extending Medicaid coverage to illegal immigrants beyond stabilization in
some circumstances may not resolve the tension between physicians and
states on one hand and the federal government on the other, it certainly
alleviates some of the pressure faced by physicians and states. It also places
more responsibility on the federal government to resolve a situation of its
own making-that of defective immigration enforcement mechanisms and
faulty legislative drafting.
The pressure placed on health care facilities to provide necessary
treatment to illegal immigrants is substantial, and lies partly in their ethical
obligations as medical professionals and partly in federal law that mandates
emergency treatment for all persons, regardless of immigration status. The
National Association of Public Hospitals and Health Systems has stated its
position as being that "[its] members are committed to providing health care
status."'12 1
services to all patients regardless of ability to pay or immigration
Public health care facilities, therefore, have an ethical obligation to provide
122
on their doorstep.
emergency treatment to illegal immigrants who turn up
In addition, however, emergency rooms have an unequivocal legal
1 3
obligation to provide emergency care under EMTALA. 2 As discussed
earlier, EMTALA states that hospitals are required to screen patients to
determine the existence of any emergency medical condition and, if

120.

Id.

121.

Nat'l Ass'n of Pub. Hosps. & Health Sys., supra note 108.

122.

MGT OF AMERICA, INC., supranote 9, at 1.

123.

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000).
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necessary, provide treatment until the patient has been stabilized.124 The
distinction between EMTALA and the Emergency Medicaid provision of §
1396b(v), with respect to who pays the costs, is critical, and reveals how a
narrow interpretation of Emergency Medicaid care may exacerbate a
problem already made worse by federal legislation.
25
In addition to EMTALA's stated purpose of halting "patient dumping,"'
it is important to note that there are no eligibility requirements for this
mandated treatment. 126 It applies to anyone who arrives at a hospital seeking
treatment, regardless of immigration status or eligibility for public
benefits. 127 The problem is that, unlike Emergency Medicaid, EMTALA
does not by itself provide for federal reimbursement for emergency
treatment. 12 Section 1396b(v), on the other hand, only provides for federal
reimbursement when a patient "otherwise meets the eligibility requirements
129
for medical assistance under the State plan approved under [Medicaid]."'
As a result, hospital emergency rooms may be forced to treat patients from
whom they can expect to receive no payment whatsoever, either from the
patient or the federal government. Hospitals that neglect to do so may be
subject to severe financial penalties, 30 and in some circumstances
physicians may even be excluded from public funding entirely.13 1 It is clear,
then, that a hospital's responsibilities under EMTALA are broader than they
are under Emergency Medicaid,
placing a hopeless financial burden on
hospital emergency rooms that treat illegal immigrants. 33 While EMTALA

124.

Id.

125.

See discussion supra Part I1.A.

126.

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1) (2000).

127.

See id

128.

Cosman, supra note 14, at 6.

129.

42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v) (2000).

130.

Cosman, supra note 14, at 6.

131.

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2000).

132.

MGT OF AMERICA,

133.

Cosman, supra note 14, at 6.

INC., supra note 9,

at v.

174
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and § 1396b(v) may serve different purposes, allowing reimbursement for an
"emergency medical condition" under Emergency Medicaid that goes
beyond merely stabilization may alleviate hospitals' concerns about
violating EMTALA and would help them to recuperate some of the financial
losses they may have sustained as a result of non-reimbursement under the
Medicaid program. 134
Given the pressure placed by the law upon physicians to treat all patients
who arrive at the emergency room, construing § 1396b(v) to apply only to
care provided up to the point of stabilization places health care providers in
the unfortunate situation of having to choose between possible violations of
EMTALA (and their ethical obligations) and the possibility of noncompensation from the Medicaid program. Construing § 1396b(v) to apply
to post-stabilization treatment of emergency conditions would therefore
lessen the burden faced by these care providers and place more of it with the
federal government, which, as discussed earlier, is ultimately responsible for
enforcement of the nation's immigration laws. In other words, resolving the
ambiguity of § 1396(b) and the definition of "emergency medical condition"
in favor of greater coverage for illegal immigrants places more of the
burden for their treatment on those responsible both for their presence in this
country (the executive and legislative branches) and those responsible for
muddying the legal waters with a statute which has resulted in differing
standards of coverage throughout the country (Congress).135
Notwithstanding the debate over the relative duties of health care
providers and the federal government in dealing with the problem of illegal
immigration, opponents of a broad interpretation of § 1396b(v) could
nevertheless argue that doctors ought to be involved in the apprehension and
reporting of illegal immigrants. Such an argument might flow from the fact
that health care providers already collect identifying information from their
patients and would be in a unique position to assist the federal government

134. Although the author has not found support for this proposition, it is conceivable
that physicians' concerns with respect to EMTALA violations might lead them to provide
care beyond stabilization to illegal immigrants, as the definitions of "emergency medical
condition" provided in EMTALA and § 1396b(v) could espouse conditions which some
health care providers do not recognize as emergency conditions. Cosman, supra note 14,
at 6. Rather than risk that an illegal immigrant's condition is not an emergency and
discharge or transfer the patient, physicians might provide treatment far beyond
reasonable stabilization to avoid the severe penalties imposed for EMITALA violations.
The problem, then, would be one of overcorrection.
135. To simplify, the narrower the interpretation of "emergency medical condition,"
the greater the burden on health care providers resulting from the federal government's
ineffective border enforcement and concededly ambiguous drafting of § 1396b(v).
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36
in its immigration enforcement efforts. In fact, the Welfare Reform Act'
provides explicit protection for state and local governmental entities that
137
choose to provide immigration information to the appropriate authorities.
When one city challenged the constitutionality of this provision, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a city cannot force its public employees to
protect information pertaining to immigration status given the federal
statute.' 38 The court's ruling has not been disturbed. Logically, it might
seem that the narrowest possible interpretation of § 1396b(v) should
therefore apply. Otherwise, health care providers would be applying two
ostensibly conflicting federal statutes-the one giving them wide discretion
to provide medical services to illegal immigrants, the other seeking their
cooperation in fighting the influx of these same immigrants. Illegal
immigrants themselves even seem to recognize the mixed message sent by
Congress. By many reports, otherwise eligible individuals are fearful of
applying for Medicaid out of39fear that their immigration status may be
reported to federal authorities.'

136.

See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.

137.

Section 434 of the Welfare Reform Act provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no
State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way
restricted, from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and
Naturalization Service information regarding the immigration status,
lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.

Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 434, 8
U.S.C. § 1644 (2000).
138. The City of New York had attempted, through an Executive Order issued by
Mayor Koch in 1989, to prevent public employees from sharing information about a
person's immigration status with the INS (with very limited exceptions). City of New
York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 31-32 (2d Cir. 1999). The Executive Order came
into direct conflict with Section 434 of the Welfare Reform Act when the latter was
passed in 1996. See id. at 32. The city sued the United States, claiming that Section 434
violated the Tenth Amendment as well as the Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
assuring the states a republican form of government. Id. at 33. The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the City's claims by the District Court, holding that
"states do not retain under the Tenth Amendment an untrammeled right to forbid all
voluntary cooperation by state or local officials with particular federal programs." Id at
35.
139. Cf Lisa Baumeister & Norman Hearst, Why Children's Health Is Threatened by
Federal Immigration Policies, W.J. MED., July 1999, at 58, 58-59.
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The argument above is unconvincing. Section 434 of the Welfare Reform
Act may seem incongruous with the Emergency Medicaid exception in §
1396b(v) if applied broadly to encompass post-stabilization treatment at the
discretion of the health care provider. But the job of health care providers is
simply to care for the infirm in accordance with their duties as medical
professionals;1 40 it is the job of federal immigration authorities to enforce
14 1
To the
immigration laws, whether at the border or within U.S. territory.
extent that the federal government has failed to uphold its responsibilities,
health care providers should not be burdened with filling the gap. Insisting
that medical providers withhold treatment beyond stabilization for illegal
immigrants in the interests of federal immigration policy would have that
effect. Perhaps that is why the drafters of Section 434 of the Welfare
Reform Act chose to make reporting of immigration status by public entities
discretionary, rather than compulsory. Anything more would amount to the
conscription of health care providers and states to enforce federal
immigration law-a requirement that would be nothing less than
overbearing. 142 If Congress believes that a narrow, stabilization-only
interpretation of § 1396b(v) is necessary to battle illegal immigration, it may
clarify the scope of Emergency Medicaid. So far, Congress has failed to do
this.
In sum, it must be recognized that doctors cannot back away from their
responsibilities for treating illegal immigrants suffering from an emergency
medical condition, and that an ambiguous statute, interpreted differently

140.

See Nat'l Ass'n of Pub. Hosps. & Health Sys.,supra note 108.

MGT OF AMERICA, INC., supra note 9, at 1; see also Lozano v. City of Hazleton,
141.
496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 521-22 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (discussing federal preemption of state law

in matters of immigration).
142. In City of New York v. United States, the Second Circuit recognized that such a
requirement might be constitutionally unsound. Citing U.S. Supreme Court precedent,
the Court stated that "even where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to
pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the
States to require or prohibit those acts." City of New York, 179 F.3d at 34 (quoting New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)).

As suggested by the Court, therefore,

any requirement that might be imposed on states and localities to report immigration
violators may run afoul of the U.S. Constitution in addition to undermining health care
providers' professional duties to provide needed care. This lends support to the idea that
just because state and health care providers can offer information about their patients to
immigration authorities, it does not mean that this wink and nod from Congress should
therefore dictate a narrow interpretation of the scope of coverage under Emergency
Medicaid.
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around the country, does not lessen this obligation. The Emergency
Medicaid provision of § 1396b(v) leaves room for coverage of treatment
beyond merely that required to stabilize the patient. And as discussed
earlier, some courts with compelling reasons have supported this
understanding.
Furthermore, HHS itself has supported an expansive
interpretation of "emergency medical condition," to the dismay of
commenters on the implementing regulations. 143
Since the federal
government has implicitly supported a broad interpretation of "emergency
medical condition," and since this same government is responsible for
enforcing immigration law, the ambiguity in § 1396b(v) should be resolved
in favor of providing post-stabilization treatment, shifting the burden of this
problem from health care providers and states to those more responsible for
the problem.
Ill. CONCLUSION
The provision of emergency medical care for illegal immigrants raises
numerous economic and social concerns. No single approach to solving this
problem has emerged or is likely to emerge anytime in the near future. One
need only examine the court decisions cited in this article to see the widely
divergent viewpoints that exist. These decisions provide a microcosmic
reflection of the deep divisions in society about the extent of emergency
health coverage that should be available to those who have entered the
United States illegally. Beyond the emotional, visceral reactions that this
topic invokes, there are sensible reasons for applying a broad, poststabilization interpretation to the "emergency medical condition" exception
in the Federal Medicaid program. The broader interpretation ensures that
the exception satisfies the original purpose of the budget-reducing bill of
which it was a part. It also places greater responsibility for determining the
existence of an emergency medical condition in the hands of health care
providers, rather than with administrative personnel who may not be fully
informed on the medical circumstances surrounding a particular case.
Finally, the broader interpretation forces the federal government to bear a
greater portion of the burden of providing services to illegal immigrants,
whose presence in this country is due primarily to the federal government's
own failure to enforce existing immigration law. And, by drafting an
admittedly ambiguous statute, health care providers have been placed in the
difficult position of potentially providing much-needed emergency services
to illegal immigrants when reimbursement for those services may ultimately

143. Medicaid Program; Eligibility of Aliens for Medicaid, 55 Fed. Reg. 36813,
36816 (Sept. 7, 1990) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. at pt. 435-36, 440).
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be denied by the State Medicaid agency, a decision, which, as we have seen,
may sometimes be affirmed by the nation's courts.
Despite the concerns attending a narrow, stabilization-only interpretation
of the emergency medical condition exception, political pressures have often
favored restricting emergency services for illegal immigrants. In 2002, and
largely due to the strain placed on states and providers, Senator Bingaman
introduced the Federal Responsibility for Immigrant Health Act of 2002,
which would have expanded Medicaid coverage for illegal immigrants to
chemotherapy and other major health services.' 44 That legislation was
allowed to languish in committee. 145 More recently, the federal government
has changed the application procedure for Medicaid reimbursement, forcing
children of illegal immigrants-many of whom are U.S. citizens-to have
an application filed for coverage separately on their behalf. 146 In the past
such coverage was provided once the mother was deemed eligible for
coverage by virtue of the delivery, a covered expense under the Emergency
Medicaid provision. 14 And recognizing Congress' own failure to pass
legislation aimed at tackling the issue of illegal immigration, many states
have recently proposed legislation that would sharply restrict the benefits
available to illegal immigrants. 14 Given such political statements, one can
care services for illegal
expect that the debate over emergency 1health
49
contentious.
be
to
continue
will
immigrants

144.

Federal Responsibility for Immigrant Health Act of 2002, S. 2449, 107th Cong. §

2(a) (2002); 148 CONG. REC. S3872, 6781-82 (daily ed. May 2, 2002) (statement of Sen.

Bingaman).
145.

GovTrack.us, S. 2449[107]: Federal Responsibility for Immigrant Health Act of

2002, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s1O7-2449
2007).
146.

(last visited Nov. 16,

Robert Pear, Medicaid Wants Citizenship Prooffor Infant Care, N.Y. TIMES,

Nov. 3, 2006, at Al.
147.

Id.

148. Fears, supra note 4; see also Claudia Lauer, Ban Could Deny Illegal Immigrants
Services, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2007, at A12 (discussing a local resolution passed by the

Prince William County, Virginia Board of Supervisors that seeks to ban illegal
immigrants from receiving most county-funded services).
149. The eventual outcome of this debate is of course not a foregone conclusion.
Proposed legislation in recent years, in addition to the Comprehensive Immigration
Reform Act of 2007, see supra notes 1-4, has attempted to both broaden as well as
restrict the available benefits to illegal immigrants. Compare H.R. 144, 110th Cong.
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Due to the high stakes of further restricting the provision of emergency
health services to illegal immigrants, there will continue to be significant
tension between health care providers and the federal government on this
issue, with State Medicaid agencies and the courts in the middle. But by
allowing Medicaid reimbursement for treatment of post-stabilization
emergencies, some of the enormous pressure currently felt by public health
facilities and states would be alleviated. To that end, the nation's courts
would do well to acknowledge the deference towards health care providers
contemplated in the Emergency Medicaid statute. This might help to extract
(2007) ("To amend the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 to allow States and localities to provide primary and preventive care to all
individuals"), with the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Act
Control Act of 2005, H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005) ("A bill to amend the Immigration
and Nationality Act to strengthen enforcement of the immigration laws, to enhance
border security, and for other purposes"), and the ENFORCE Act, S. 2117, 109th Cong. §
705 (2005) (adding "employment services" to the list of public benefits unavailable to
those not lawfully present in the U.S. under the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996). Given the politically toxic nature of the debate
over illegal immigration, it remains to be seen whether any combination of political
parties as between the executive and legislative branches will be able to assert its strength
in either expanding or restricting services for illegal immigrants at the federal level.
Despite strong ideological agreement between many moderate Republicans and the
Democratic Party in the U.S. Congress on the issue of illegal immigration, continued
gridlock on this issue can undoubtedly be expected as between the states and the federal
government. In taking up the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act, Congress
revealed a remarkable degree of bipartisanship in its support for, among other things, the
idea of providing a path to citizenship for the illegal immigrants presently in the United
States, just as it had in 1986 when it passed legislation legalizing roughly three million
illegal immigrants. See Hook, supra note 4. By contrast, many states have balked at the
idea and have passed legislation intended to stem the flow of illegal immigrants into their
territory, or at least restrict the benefits available to them. Fears, supra note 4; Jennifer
Steinhauer, As States Innovate on Issues, Schwarzenegger Blurs the Party Lines, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2007, at AI8. While the courts have not spoken conclusively on such
legislation, one recent high-profile case involving restrictive local ordinances passed by
the City of Hazleton, Pennsylvania resulted in the ordinances being struck down by a
federal district court, largely because of federal preemption in immigration matters. See
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007). The ruling may signal
a trend in the courts toward striking down similar ordinances that seek to restrict services
for illegal immigrants independently of federal law. Cynthia Leonor Garza & Mark
Babineck, Advocates See Domino Effect in Judge's Illegal Immigrant Ruling, Hous.
CHRON., July 27, 2007, at Al. The same effect could possibly be seen in challenges to
restrictive state laws as well. See Daniel Gonzfilez, Pa. Ruling Heartens Foes of Ariz.
Law, ARIZ. REP., July 27, 2007, at A18, available at http://www.azcentral.com/
aizonarepublic/news/articles/0727hazletoncase0727.html.
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some of the politics from this issue and replace it with sensible policy that
seeks to address the problem of illegal immigrant health care in a way that
acknowledges the shared burden of local health care providers, as well as the
federal government. To do otherwise would be to broaden the scope of the
problem beyond the negative effects already seen to an extent that the
United States cannot afford. And that is a scenario that no one should want
to see develop.

